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The North Korea-China Relationship: Context and Dynamics 
 
Tim Beal* 
 
Abstract 
 
All bilateral relationships are embedded within a wider context, but 
nowhere is this context more important than in the North Korea China 
relationship.  For North Korea (the DPRK), China has been a bulwark 
against the United States, and in earlier periods, a counterbalance to 
the Soviet Union.  However, North Korea has always been wary of 
becoming too dependent on China and one reason, though obviously 
not the major one, for its desire to establish normal and even friendly, 
relations with the United States, and Japan, is to offset Chinese 
influence.  For China also, the United States is the main focus of 
attention and the relationship with North Korea is important not so 
much in itself, but for its impact on China’s relationship with the US 
and to a lesser extent with Japan (the fear that the nuclearisation of the 
DPRK will facilitate the remilitarisation and nuclearisation of Japan) 
and with South Korea.  Although diplomatic relations between Beijing 
and Seoul have only been established for 15 years, there has been 
explosive growth in the economic relationship, with positive 
repercussions in political, sporting and cultural (eg Hallyu) linkages. 
China is inevitably embroiled in, and is perhaps the underlying target 
of, the US offensive against North Korea, and the Banco Delta Asia 
affair provides an illuminating example of that.  The Six Party Talks 
framework provides a convenient way of analysing this context because 
not merely does it bring together the major ancillary players to the 
bilateral Beijing-Pyongyang relationship but its institutional existence 
                                                
* Senior Lecturer, School of Marketing and International Business, Victoria University of 
Wellington, New Zealand, and Honorary Research Fellow, Political Economic Research 
Centre, University of Sheffield (UK). This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 
Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences’ International Conference on China and 
Korea: A New Nexus in East Asia?, held at Lingnan University, Hong Kong,30-31 May 
2007.  I am grateful to Dr. Graham Harrison, Co-Director of Sheffield University’s 
Political Economy Research Centre, for providing me with facilities at PERC during the 
writing of this, and other papers in 2006-07.  Thanks are also due to Ankie Hoogvelt for 
her comments on an earlier draft. My greatest debt is to Professor Brian Bridges both for 
inviting me to the Lingnan Korea conference and for encouraging me to produce this 
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is the prime expression of the dynamic interaction between the 
constituent members. 
 
 
All bilateral relationships are embedded within a wider context, but 
nowhere is this context more important than in the North Korea-China 
relationship .1  The framework of the Six-Party Talks, designed to solve 
the nuclear issue, provides a convenient way of analysing this context 
because not merely does it bring together the major ancillary players to 
the bilateral Beijing-Pyongyang relationship but its institutional 
existence is the prime expression of the dynamic interaction between 
the constituent members.  
 
Getting reasonably reliable and plausible information on this area is a 
difficult and tiresome business.  The Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), or North Korea, releases very little information and 
what is released, for instance by the Korean Central News Agency 
(KCNA), is seldom information.  China is better, and perhaps getting 
better, but the media is circumscribed, as it would seem are most 
academics.  The main thrust of Chinese diplomacy is not to give 
offence to anyone, especially the Americans in case they are tempted to 
spoil China’s peaceful rise.  Japan is always rather  an exception to this; 
it has been impossible for instance, for Beijing to ignore official visits 
to the Yasukuni shrine. Harsh words have been used in respect of North 
Korea’s nuclear tests, and of India’s .2 Nevertheless, the general tone is 
bland and conformist.  The United States, South Korea (the Republic of 
Korea) and, to a lesser extent, Japan, offer more voluminous and 
interesting, sometimes astringent and vituperative, fare.  But all of it 
must be deconstructed.  Quantitative data offers firmer ground, but 
figures can be deceptive in their very appearance of authority.  
Deliberate lies aside, there all sorts of reasons why figures can be 
incorrect. Moreover, there are often lacunae, sometimes in the most 
annoying places. Any outside assessment of the North Korea-China 
relationship must be very cautious and tentative. 
 
DPRK: the Economic Relationship 
 
North Korea does not issue much in the way of statistics so any picture 
of the country’s trade and investment relationship must be pieced 
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together from partner data.  That raises considerable methodological 
problems of compatibility, comparability, detail, and timing. Different 
sources (and sometimes the same one in different places) can give quite 
substantial variants for the same item. For instance it will be noted that 
the figures for total DPRK trade given by Li Dunqiu (Table A1) differ 
considerably from those in Table A2, part C. Part of the reason for the 
discrepancy may lie in the definition of ‘foreign trade’.  The South 
Koreans do not regard trade with the North as foreign, but rather ‘inter-
Korean’, or ‘Intra-Korean’.  If the North does the same, as is likely, and 
if Li got his figures from DPRK sources (he does not identify his 
source) then this might account for the some of the difference, but not 
all of it. More research needs to be done. 
 
Li Dunqiu claims that ‘Sino-DPRK trade and economic cooperation 
grows at an eye-catching pace’, but the figures he presents do not bear 
this out. 3   His data is tabulated in Appendix Table A1, and the 
calculations for percentage share graphed in Fig 1.  However, figs 2 
and 3 which have a longer perspective (1989-2003 rather than 1997-
2005), and are perhaps based on better data (Table A2) does support his 
assertion. It also confirms his point that the increase in China’s share of 
North Korea’s trade is due to the decrease in Japan’s share, and that is 
discussed below.   
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Fig 1: China’s share of North Korea trade, 1997-2005 
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Fig 2 (exports and Fig 3 (imports) tell basically the same story.   Russia, 
which as the Soviet Union, was North Korea’s main trading partner in 
1989 (and the preceding period) has faded out of the picture.  There 
may well be a resurgence in Russia’s role in the North Korean 
economy, especially if Putin’s successor continues to pay more 
attention to East Asia, and if North Korea railway network is upgraded, 
and reconnected to the South. 
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Fig 2: North Korea’s main exports markets, 1989, 1999, 2003 
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Inter-Korea trade has grown considerably over this period and its 
growth looks set to continue, the geopolitical situation permitting.  
Much of it is due to the Gaesong [Kaesong] Industrial Complex (GIC). 
By 2005 the GIC accounted for 16.7% of inter-Korea trade.4  There was 
no trade, or at least no official trade, between the two Koreas until the 
late eighties.  It appears the first South Korean licences were issued in 
1998 and trade appears in the statistics from 1989.  In that first year the 
North’s exports to the South were recorded as $19 million, and imports 
from the South at $0.1 million.  Since then the trade had grown 
enormously and the balance has shifted very much to the South’s 
favour.  In 2005 the North’s exports were $340 million and imports 
$715 million.  A proportion of the imports from the South would have 
been capital goods and materials for GIC, and part inputs for the 
processing-on-commission trade, mainly textiles and electronics. 
However, aid is a substantial component; the ROK Ministry of 
Unification describes only 65% of the trade as ‘commercial;’, and 
presumably the 35% ‘non-commercial’ means aid.5  
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Fig 3: North Korea’s major import sources, 1989, 1999, 2003 
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The proportion of trade with Japan has gone up and subsequently down 
and that is discussed in more detail in the next section. China’s share of 
North Korea’s trade has risen over the period 1989-2003 but the course 
of exports and imports has differed significantly. North Korea’s exports 
to China seem to have been fairly stagnant up to the mid 1990s, then 
dropped considerably before recovering from 2000 onwards. Imports, 
on the other hand, grew slowly from 1989 to 2004, when they did start 
to exhibit that ‘eye catching pace’ that Lin Dunqiu describes.  Currently, 
according to Li, China accounts for 40% of North Korea’s trade and 
70% of its inward investment.6 
 
Does this mean that North Korea is becoming a Chinese colony, as 
some South Korean and Japanese commentators claim?  The Chosun 
Ilbo is particularly keen on this story.7  It endorses the remark of an 
unnamed Japanese ‘Korea expert’ who asserted that "No problem can 
be resolved until America recognizes that North Korea is wholly a 
tributary nation of China."8 There is a scintilla of truth in this, in that 
North Korea is heavily dependent of China, at least economically, and 
becoming more so. However, there are two things which put a different 
perspective on the situation. 
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Firstly, North Korea is ‘joining the club’ in becoming enmeshed in the 
Chinese economy.  China last year overtook the United States to 
become Japan’s leading trading partner.9 China has also begun to invest 
seriously in Japan and soon will be buying up Japanese companies in 
the way that the Chinese computer giant Lenovo acquired IBM’s PC 
division.10 China has been South Korea’s major trading partner since 
2003, a substantial investor (eg Ssangyong Motor acquired by Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Company, SAIC, in 200411), and a Free Trade 
Agreement is under negotiation.12  China is already the world’s third 
largest trader and in the second half of 2006 it overtook the United 
States, the world’s number two. China is poised to overtake frontrunner 
Germany before long.13 Burgeoning trade with China is not unusual.  
Admittedly, China’s 40% share of North Korea’s trade is considerably 
higher than its share of South Korea’s (22% of exports and 15% of 
imports in 2005). 14  However, North Korea’s trade dependency on 
China is far less than, for instance, Canada’s on the United States (84% 
of exports and 57% of imports in 2005). 15   There has also been 
considerable criticism of, and opposition to, the US -South Korea Free 
Trade Agreement (KORUSFTA) on the grounds that it disadvantages 
and subordinates South Korea.16  To add a twist, some of the Chinese 
forays into North Korea have been done in cooperation with South 
Korean partners.17  
 
It is clear that North Korea’s dependence on China for trade and 
investment is unhealthily high and dangerous.  That is not a comment 
on China itself, but merely a reflection of the commonsense adage 
about all eggs in one basket. All prudent countries attempt to divers ify 
their trade and investment partners where possible.  Japan for many 
years agonised over its trade dependency on the United States and 
sought to spread its trade.18 This brings us to the second objection to the 
facile allegation of Chinese ‘colonialisation’ of North Korea.  The 
evidence suggests that North Korea has resisted the Chinese advance 
but has been forced into greater dependence on China by Japanese and 
US policy.  American trade with North Korea has always been 
miniscule, and the reason for that lies with Washington not Pyongyang.  
With Japan, however, the case is different.  As figures 2 and 3, and 
Table A2 illustrate, Japan has been an important trading partner for 
North Korea, especially for exports, and after the collapse of the Soviet 
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Union it became North Korea’s major export market before being 
supplanted by China in 2002. 
 
Japan 
 
Why did Japan occupy such a leading role in North Korea’s  trade, 
especially exports?  Economic reasons of complementarity and 
proximity must have been factors, as well as the trade policy imperative 
of diversification.  North Korea produces products such as fish and 
minerals in demand in Japan. The extensive ethnic Korean community 
in Japan is another factor.  It is said that much of the trade is conducted 
by members of Chongryon (Chongryun in the Southern spelling, 
Chosen Soren in Japanese), the General Association of Korean 
Residents in Japan.19 This has been a great advantage to North Korea, 
but also a point of vulnerability because when the Japan government 
decided to squeeze the trade, it was able to do it via harassing 
Chongryon. 
 
It is frequently observed that an important cause of the increase in 
North Korea’s trade with China has been the precipitous decline in 
trade with Japan.20  This is clearly shown in Fig 4, Table A3. 
 
Fig 4: Japan’s trade with North Korea, 1988-2006 
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Source: Appendix Table A3 
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The reason for the great surge in recorded exports in 2001 is an aid 
consignment of 499,999 metric tons of rice valued at ¥112,247,268.21   
Leaving that out, the decline in trade over the period is apparent.  This 
decline accelerates after 2002 because of increasing restrictions and 
actions by the Japanese government, culminating in a total ban in 
October 2006.22 The reasons for the Japanese government actions are 
inevitably contested, and there are many mysteries.  I have looked at 
this at some length elsewhere so a relatively brief recapitulation will 
suffice here.23 This may appear to be a digression but is, in fact, vitally 
important to the China-North Korea relationship.  The Japanese drive to 
remilitarisation and the concomitant promotion of a resurgent 
nationalism and ‘patriotism’ (including denial of government 
responsibility for ‘comfort women’, official visits to the Yasukuni 
shrine, and textbook revision) is , after the rise of China (to which it is 
partly a response),  the major issue in contemporary East Asia, and 
hence has profound implications for the relationships between the Six 
Party states, and for global geopolitics in general. The ‘North Korea 
issue’ is utilised as the principal driver of this process.  
 
Many commentators overlook or downplay the Japanese 
remilitarisation campaign, relegating Japanese politicians to passive 
onlookers who are ‘encouraged’ to do things, such as to acquire nuclear 
weapons, that would not otherwise have much interested them.  For 
instance, Professor Aaron L. Friedberg, Professor of Politics and 
International Affairs, Princeton University, testifying before the United 
States-China Economic and Security Review Commission of Congress 
in November 2006, opined: 
 
A final risk for China is that the open acquisition by North Korea 
of nuclear weapons could encourage others in the region to 
follow suit, including Japan and Taiwan. Pyongyang’s 
provocative actions and bombastic claims have already increased 
this danger. The best that Beijing can do to keep things under 
control is to make sure that the North does not remove all doubt 
about its capabilities by conducting a weapons test. This is 
probably a “redline” that the Chinese have warned Kim Jong-Il 
not to cross.24  
 
 10 
In fact, North Korea had crossed that ‘redline’ the previous month and 
whilst China had expressed annoyance there was no significant 
rupturing of relations between Beijing and Pyongyang.25 However, the 
important thing about this statement is the low significance it gives to 
the impact of the ‘North Korea nuclear issue’ on the remilitarisation 
debate in Japan – it is merely ‘a final risk’. 26  It is as if Abe Shinzo did 
not exist.  Abe’s efforts to amend the Japanese constitution and 
remilitarise, legally and functionally, may well not be successful but 
one cannot ignore its centrality in his thinking, and his utilisation of the 
abductee issue, and the North Korean threat’. 27 This means that we 
need to say something about the course of Japan-North Korea relations 
over the last few years and see how that fits in with Japanese 
remilitarisation, and hence with China’s relationship with North Korea. 
 
The official Japanese explanation of events can be found on the Japan-
North Korea Relations page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
website. 28  This perspective is, as might be expected, found in the 
mainstream press and academic literature.  There is only a handful of 
critical scholars, prominent amongst whom are Gavan McCormack and 
Wada Haruki. 29   
 
In September 2002 Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro 
responded to requests from Pyongyang, and pressure from some of his 
officials, to agree to a summit with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang (17 
September). He overruled opposition from Abe, who was opposed to 
any rapprochement with the DPRK.  At first sight the summit seemed 
to work. The Japanese made a guarded apology for colonialism, and 
promised to normalise relations, with the implied lure of reparations, 
investment, and increased trade.  The North Koreans apologised for a 
number of abductions of Japanese citizens over the previous two 
decades and promised that any of the survivors, and their children, who 
wanted to go to Japan would be free to do so. The situation quickly 
soured and Koizumi, presumably under pressure from Abe, and from 
the Americans who were worried that a Tokyo-Pyongyang détente 
would outflank their strategic position in East Asia, claimed that the 
North Koreans were not sincere and were not accounting for all the 
abductees.  It is likely that he was surprised by how easily the media 
whipped up anti-Korean hysteria over the issue and decided to ride the 
wave.  The abductees issue has bubbled on since then. Whatever the 
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undisclosed facts of the case, the North Koreans can never prove that 
all the abductees have been accounted for although given the 
seriousness of their position it is difficult to see any reason why they 
would not want the matter settled.  Things are very different on the 
Japanese side.  The issue is very emotive and politicians can earn easy 
popularity by playing on it though there are indications that that is not 
working so well any more, with Abe’s popularity slumping.30 
 
Abe’s position and role in all this is fairly clear, and accepted in part at 
least by the mainstream press.  He wants to change the education 
system to inculcate feelings of patriotism in the young. He wants Japan 
to amend its ‘Peace Constitution’ to become a ‘normal country’.  There 
is considerable concern in China, and in South Korea, that Japanese 
remilitarisation, quite possibly involving nuclearisation, will fuel an 
arms race. Despite its constitution Japan already has a massive military 
budget, and with its technological base, could soon become one of the 
world’s most formidable military powers.  This is not a prospect which 
please Beijing, Seoul or, of course, Pyongyang.   
 
However, there is strong pacifist sentiment in Japan, and nuclear 
weapons are particularly abhorrent.  The abductees issue, and the North 
Korean ‘threat’ in general is the vehicle by which Abe hopes to win 
over the electorate.  Whether he will succeed is unknown, but Chinese 
and South Korean concerns about Japanese remilitarisation inform their 
views on the Six Party Talks, and on North Korea.   
 
Despite his adroit diplomacy in visiting China and South Korea soon 
after becoming Prime Minister in September 2006, and refraining from 
the official visits to the Yasukuni shrine by which Koizumi so inflamed 
Northeast Asia, Abe seems to be privileging the domestic drive for 
remilitarisation, which involves the North Korea issue and the history 
of Japanese colonialism (eg ‘comfort women’) as a driving force, to the 
detriment of foreign relations. He has continued to bring the issue of 
the abductees to the Six-Party Talks to the indignation of North Korea 
and increasing annoyance of not merely South Korea (and one 
presumes, China) but also the United States. 
 
Efforts to keep the abductee issue inflamed seem increasingly desperate.  
The latest incident involved a high-profile raid on the office of 
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Chongryon in search of a woman who was accused of helping, in 1974, 
to abduct two children from their Japanese mother to rejoin their 
Korean father in North Korea.  Whatever the rights and wrongs of this 
particular distant case, it seems to have been a domestic incident, and 
perhaps a lot of them were. 31  
 
President George Bush’s warm reception of Abe on his visit to 
Washington in late April 2007 despite the Japanese Prime Minister’s 
refusal to accept official culpability for the ‘comfort women’, and his 
acceptance of the Japanese argument that the abductee issue constituted 
an act of terrorism that had to be resolved (to Japan’s satisfaction) 
before North Korea could be removed from the terrorism list caused 
public anger in Seoul, and presumably private concern in Beijing.32  
Here, it seems, was another promise given in the Initial Actions 
Agreement of 13 February 2007, made by the six parties, that was not 
to be honoured.  The promise, which was quoted without apology for 
the delay, pledges the United States to begin the process of removing 
the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism’. 33  By 
tying in the Japanese claim it implied that not merely had the process 
not started, but it would never be completed.  The reasons for Bush’s 
vacillations are difficult to interpret (his acceptance of the agreement 
was seen as a rebuff of Abe 34), but for Abe the issue is much more 
clear-cut. The US concession on abductees effectively gives him a veto 
over the Initial Actions Agreement, and US policy, and that is quite a 
coup. The abductee issue, and the perception of a North Korea threat, 
which is reinforced by any stalling of the Initial Actions Agreement, is 
an essential element of his campaign for remilitarisation, and he is 
unlikely to renounce the advantage Bush has given him.  That brings us 
back to China.  As Jang Jung-soo, an editorial writer for the Seoul 
newspaper Hankyoreh, put it: 
 
According to Korea expert Selig Harrison, the Japanese emphasis 
on the abduction issue serves to prolong troubled relations with 
the North and to further justify Japanese remilitarization. Of 
course, the true reason for Japan’s rearmament is related to its 
deep-seated rivalry with China. Yet a full confrontation with 
China would be politically burdensome, so Japan is using North 
Korea as a convenient prop in the meantime.35 
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If North Korea is a proxy for China in Japan’s push for remilitarisation 
then this adds another layer of complexity to the China-North Korea 
relationship. China may want to deprive Japan of the ‘North Korean 
excuse’, but just leaning on Pyongyang does not address the 
fundamental issue.  Moreover, the DPRK nuclear programme is driven 
not by Japan-North Korea relations nor, as is so often alleged without 
any supporting evidence or rationale, by Kim Jong Il’s obsession with 
acquiring a nuclear deterrent irrespective of costs and benefits, beyond 
rational calculation. Aaron L. Friedberg, for instance, argues that  
“Given Kim Jong Il's evident commitment to developing nuclear 
weapons, it's highly unlikely that he'll ever agree to give them up unless 
the alternative to doing so is his own imminent demise.” 36  On the 
contrary, the North Korean weapons programme is the product of a 
tortuous, decades-long, negotiation with the United States over 
peaceful coexistence.  The main reason that that negotiation has been 
so prolonged, and is not yet resolved, is that it is subsumed under the 
long-term US strategy, going back to the late 1940s, of ‘containing 
China’. North Korea is not merely a China proxy for Japan but, even 
more important, for the United States as well.  That is discussed below. 
 
For North Korea the relationship with Japan has primarily an economic 
focus.  It wants trade, aid, perhaps investment, certainly the oil 
negotiated under the Six Party agreement, and hopefully reparations. 
For Japan, the economic relationship with North Korea, even at its 
height, is of little consequence and has been sacrificed, apparently 
without qualms or much discussion, for political reasons.  
 
South Korea  
 
South Korea fits into this analysis of Chinese relations with the DPRK 
in two ways. Firstly, in terms of its political and economic importance 
to China, both in itself and in comparison with the DPRK. Secondly, as 
a source of information on actual and assumed issues between China 
and the DPRK, as well as offering an insight into Chinese attitudes 
towards the Six-Party Talks and the participants, principally Japan and 
the United States, which are not expressed by the Chinese for reasons 
of diplomacy. 
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Politics and economics are intertwined, and it is usually, and with good 
reason, argued that China established diplomatic relations with South 
Korea in 1992 because of growing trade through the 1980s and despite 
strenuous opposition from North Korea. 37  Here we have the flag 
following trade, though the flag having being planted helped greatly to 
accelerate the trade.  We look first to the economic relationship before 
turning to the political and what it might tell us about attitudes and 
opinions. 
 
For reasons of space the data which is the source for the two graphs in 
this section are tabulated in the appendix.  It must be acknowledged 
that the data available is unsatisfactory, especially for the crucial 
decade of the 1980s.  I have used Chinese statistical yearbooks, 
hardcopy for the early years, but on the web for the most recent years.  
Library resources in New Zealand are inadequate and I have had to fall 
back on my own, incomplete, collection of yearbooks.  However, that is 
the lesser problem in respect of the 1980s because, for political reasons, 
China was not reporting trade with South Korea.  It is only in 1990, in 
the collection that I have, that South Korea is first mentioned.  It may 
have been reported in 1989, but the 1989 Almanac of China’s Foreign 
Economic Relations and Trade, which covers 1988 (and 1987) makes 
no mention of the ROK.  What trade there was, and it must have been 
quite considerable by the late 1980s, seems to have been routed through 
Hong Kong, and reported as Hong Kong trade.38 
 
Fig 5 charts the share of the DPRK and ROK in China’s exports for the 
period 1950-2005.  There is uninterrupted data for the first 30 years, up 
to 1980, but intermittent data after that. Nevertheless, the general 
picture is clear.  Whatever happened during the 1980s, by 1990 the 
ROK is already a far larger export market for China that the DPRK, 
and the gaps widens as exports to ROK rise, and exports to DPRK fall.  
In 2005 China’s exports to DPRK were $1,081 million, being 0.1% of 
her total exports, while those to ROK were over thirty times larger at 
$35,107.8, or 4.6 % of China’s exports. South Korea was China’s fifth 
largest export market.   
 
ROK is much more important to China as an export destination and the 
gap between them is likely to change much in the future, unless there is 
a dramatic recovery of the DPRK economy. However, it is also 
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important to take a glance back into history and note just how 
important the DPRK market was to China in the 1950s through to the 
mid 1970s.  In 1954 North Korea took 6.9% of China’s exports, a rate 
not achieved by South Korea, nor likely to be.  The importance of 
North Korea was due to particular political and economic 
circumstances.  China was suffering much the same restrictions on its 
trade by the United States as North Korea is today. Chinese statistics 
show no trade with the United States between 1954 and 1972 (and tiny 
amounts 1951-53).  In 1972 China still did more trade with North 
Korea than with the United States. 39   This was purely a political 
restriction, mainly on the part of the United States, and once that was 
lifted, trade boomed.  Political considerations were paramount in 
respect of South Korea, of course, but there were economic ones as 
well.  During that period the DPRK economy was larger than that of 
the ROK.40   
 
Fig 5: Share of DPRK and ROK in China’s exports, 1950-2005 
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Source; Appendix A4 
 
Figure 6, which charts import share over the same period, paints much 
the same pic ture, but there are differences.  The DPRK was a much 
smaller source of imports, than a destination for exports.  With South 
Korea it has been different, with imports outstripping exports, and this 
is probably related to South Korea FDI in China and the importing of 
capital equipment and components. 
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Fig 6: Share of DPRK and ROK in China’s imports, 1950-2005 
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Tables A5 to A7 present other aspects of China’s economic interaction 
with the Koreas for 2004.  Table A5 shows civil engineering projects 
and the like; the South’s share is much larger than the North’s and there 
is an increase between 2004-05.  Table A6 shows the major 
destinations of China’s overseas investment.  The DPRK is not 
mentioned, either for political reasons, or because the figure is too 
small (the original table is not comprehensive and only shows 
important destinations).  The identified countries in Asia account for 
96% of the ‘Accumulated Net Overseas Direct Investment at the End of 
2005’, so whatever Chinese investment there is in North Korea it is 
likely to be small.  The veracity of Chinese statistics sometimes comes 
under attack, and all statistics should be treated with caution but we can 
be confident that Chinese investment in North Korea is not large, 
especially in comparison with investment in the South.  It is interesting 
to note the big increase between 2004 and 2005, which may be related 
to the acquisition of Ssangyong.  Data on foreign investment in China 
is more comprehensive (Table A7), and here there are figures for 
investment from the DPRK. Again it is very small both absolutely, and 
in comparison with the ROK. 
 
From an economic perspective it is clear that South Korea is far more 
important to China than to North Korea, and will remain so.  The 
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economic relationship with the ROK has blossomed since the 
establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, but that rapprochement 
in turn was due to economic factors (the growth of unofficial then 
official trade, and the lure of future economic benefit) as well as the 
complexities of geopolitics especially the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
 
From the point of view of Seoul (Roh Tae Woo was then president) the 
linkage with Beijing was an obvious outflanking of Pyongyang, 
especially as there was no counterpart action on the Washington-
Pyongyang axis. Why this was so is an important question.41  China 
was able to insist on the one-China policy and force South Korea to 
ditch Taiwan. China may have seen establishing relations with South 
Korea, and encouraging economic linkages, as lessening the South 
Korean reliance on the United States, and that has come to pass.42 
South Koreans, especially the young, are less deferential towards the 
United States.43 However, the role of the Chinese relationship in this is 
unclear.  Anti-Japanese feeling impacts on attitudes towards the United 
States because of the closeness of the Japan-US relationship both at a 
security and personal level.44 The anticipated American sales of F-22 
Raptor ‘stealth fighters’ to Japan, under the pretext of countering a 
North Korean threat, but clearly aimed at China, is seen in South Korea 
as yet another example of the US preference for Japan.  The right-wing 
and basically pro-American Seoul daily Chosun Ilbo agonised that, 
‘The South Korean Air Force, composed mainly of F-15 and F-16 
fighters, would be powerless in front of the Japanese Air Self Defense 
Force equipped with F-22s.’45  
 
There has been a global rise in anti-Americanism, much exacerbated by 
the presidency of George W. Bush, and South Korea is no exceptio n to 
the trend.46 Young South Koreans are turning not merely away from the 
United States, but towards China. 47  At the same time there is 
considerable anti-Chinese sentiment within the elite and probably a 
concerted campaign to counter the pro-China, anti-American trend 48 
Anti-Chinese sentiments are inevitable in Korea, and among China’s 
neighbours in general.  China has been both the source of much of their 
culture, and a suzerain power, and at times an occupier. This is a 
universal phenomenon; it is hard to think of any countries that do not 
have historical grudges against their neighbours.  There is perhaps also 
resentment against China for having failed to protect Korea against 
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Japan. Chinese intervention in the Korean War must also be a potent 
source of antipathy in certain elite quarters.  Had it not been for that 
intervention the United States would have won, and have established 
the Southern regime, and its elite, in the North. This raises 
complications if we are to use expressed South Korean opinions about 
China as a surrogate for North Korean opinions which are not openly 
expressed.  To some degree the anti-China campaign is informed by 
pro-Americanism, and the need to continue a climate of opinion in 
which identification with America, and its policies, is seen as natural 
and legitimate.  Much of the South Korean elite owes its position to its 
relationship with the United States, and often to the Japanese before 
them, and that has meant being anti-China. 
 
This anti-China feeling amongst the elite manifests itself in two ways.  
One revolves around historical issues, especially the ancient state of 
Koguryo which is claimed by both Korea and China as part of their 
legacy. There are frequent references in the South Korea media to 
Koguryo and recently the Washington Post carried a story on the use of 
television to wage this ‘historical war’. 49  The ROK government is 
reported to be intending to revise history textbooks to lay claim to the 
contested state of Kojoson, although this has been criticised by South 
Korean historians as blurring ‘the line between myth and historical 
facts’. 50   In February 2007 a South Korean woman’s skating team 
caused a bit of a diplomatic incident at a winter sports event in China 
by holding up signs saying “Mount Paektu is our land”.51  
 
It is difficult to be sure how much these historical issues resonate in the 
North.  KCNA says nothing and if we are to believe official North 
Korea reports all is sweetness and light.52 Kim Jong Il made an unusual 
and high profile visit to the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang on 4 March 
2007, the last day of the lunar new year and, as KCNA put it, 
emphasising the symbolism of a shared heritage, ‘the folklore holiday 
of Korea and China.’53  The South Korean press has published very 
plausible articles on North Korea’s ‘indirect’ criticism of China: ‘The 
North recently increased the volume of such reports in an apparent 
protest against what it sees as China's bid to distort early Korean 
history. However, it refrained from directly criticizing its staunch 
ally’. 54 
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The other aspect of the anti-China position is the opinion discussed 
above which is most evident in right-wing papers such as the Chosun 
Ilbo, that North Korea is a ‘Chinese colony’. The March visit of Kim 
Jong Il to the Chinese embassy was seen by the Chosun Ilbo as handing 
the north over to China ‘with a smile’: ‘In just a few years, China 
acquired 50-year rights to a North Korean iron, coal, copper, zinc, gold 
and molybdenum mines. Exclusive, 50-year usage rights to Rhajin Port, 
construction rights to the Tumen River-Chongjin rail way also went 
over to China. It is no wonder that people are starting to say North 
Korea is becoming another Chinese province’.55  In reality the North 
seems to have delayed making these concessions for a long time – the 
economic crisis has been going on for over a decade and a half.  
 
Russia  
 
Whilst the Soviet Union played a hugely important role in North Korea 
affairs, the successor Russian Federation has been, so far, a bit player.  
However, its economic and political involvement may be resuscitated 
in the future to an unknown degree, though it is never likely to regain 
its former influence.  Nonetheless, its involvement in the North Korea 
economy (railways and providing employment in the lumber industry 
of the Russian Far East), and in the Six-Party Talks does provide some 
counterbalance to China.  It was the Russian delegate to the talks, 
Aleksandr Losyukov, who at the breakdown over financial sanctions in 
March 2007 was refreshingly frank. “ The American side promised to 
resolve the financial question, and this promise was not fulfilled”, he 
was reported as saying.56 For their own diplomatic reasons, neither the 
Chinese nor the South Koreans could be so blunt. 
 
The United States 
 
The country with the most impact and influence on China’s relations 
with North Korea is clearly the United States.  Twenty or thirty years 
ago one might have put the Soviet Union in that position, but not with 
the paramountcy that the United States today assumes.  South Korea 
has an influence, but important middle power as it is, its political, 
military, and economic strength is a fraction of that of the United States. 
Moreover its subordination to the United States lessens its independent 
role.  Japan is also subordinate, albeit in a different way and with far 
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more inherent economic, technology and military strength.  The 
revision of the description of the DPRK’s alleged links with terrorism 
to retain Japanese abductees but to exclude South Korean ones, was 
seen in Seoul as a bellwether of their relative influence in 
Washington.57  Stronger or weaker, for both countries their relationship 
with North Korea, their influence on the Chinese relationship with 
North, and indeed their relationship with China itself, is often mediated 
through their relationship with the United States.  Japan’s drive towards 
remilitarisation, with all the implications that has for the relationship 
with North Korea and with China (and South Korea too of course) can 
only happen with the permission and encouragement of the United 
States.  
 
This importance and centrality of the United Sates could lead to an 
extensive discussion but for brevity I will focus on two matters; the 
reports that North Korea is looking for a relationship with the United 
States to offset China, and the Banco Delta Asia Affair. 
 
Kim Dae-jung has long claimed that Kim Jong Il had told him at their 
summit in 2000 ‘that there was a role for the United States on the 
Korean Peninsula to balance Russian, Chinese and Japanese 
influence’.58 Governor Bill Richardson came back from officiating at 
the handover of remains of some American soldiers from the Korean 
War saying, in an interview on National Public Radio, that   
 
“Interestingly, North Korea sees themselves (sic) eventually as an 
ally of the United States; in other words, as an ally against China. 
They see themselves as playing a strategic role as a buffer 
between the United States and China. I'm not sure how realistic 
that is, but it's interesting that they see themselves, first, as a 
major power, and secondly, as having the same interests in Asia 
as the United States and other countries —  which is basically to 
contain China a bit.”59 
 
A more articulated and considered exposition was given by Robert 
Carlin and John W. Lewis in an op-ed in the Washington Post on 27 
January.  They, too, had returned from Pyongyang with the same 
message.  Carlin is a former State Department analyst who had 
participated in most of the US-DPRK negotiations in the Clinton period.  
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Lewis is a professor emeritus at Stanford. Both had visited North Ko rea 
many times, most recently in October-November 2006 in the company 
of Charles ‘Jack’ Pritchard, former North Korea officer in the States 
Department, and Siegfried Hecker, the Los Alamos scientist who has 
made pronouncements on North Korea’s nuclear programme.60  If ever 
there was a group of authoritative insiders who were in a position to go 
beyond official platitudes, this was it.  The story was headed ‘What 
North Korea really wants’, and their answer was: 
 
What is it, then, that North Korea wants? Above all, it wants, and 
has pursued steadily since 1991, a long-term, strategic 
relationship with the United States. This has nothing to do with 
ideology or political philosophy. It is a cold, hard calculation 
based on history and the realities of geopolitics as perceived in 
Pyongyang. The North Koreans believe in their gut that they must 
buffer the heavy influence their neighbors already have, or could 
soon gain, over their small, weak country… . 
If the United States has leverage, it is not in its ability to supply 
fuel oil or grain or paper promises of nonhostility. The leverage 
rests in Washington's ability to convince Pyongyang of its 
commitment to coexist with the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea, accept its system and leadership, and make room for the 
DPRK in an American vision of the future of Northeast Asia. 
Quite simply, the North Koreans believe they could be useful to 
the United States in a longer, larger balance-of-power game 
against China and Japan. The Chinese know this and say so in 
private. 
 
The question is, is this really new? Probably not.  A trawl of the 
archives over the last few decades would probably reveal a number of 
coded overtures.  Is this likely to produce a change in US policy?  Also 
probably not, for the duration of this administration at least, but it does 
open up the way for a post-Bush administration to change tack, if it so 
desires.  One way to deflect criticism that it would be accommodating 
the little devil by accepting coexistence would be to argue that by doing 
so it would be strengthening the alliance against the big devil, China.   
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The BDA affair 
 
It is clear that China lurks behind American thinking about North 
Korea and the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) affair provides an interesting 
illustration of this.  The BDA problem is still going on, and what 
exactly will happen is unknown.  Much of what has happened, or rather 
why it happened, is necessarily speculative, but there is a reasonable 
amount of information now in the public domain to make some 
informed conjectures. 
 
The BDA affair has its origins back in 2003 when, according to David 
Asher, then Senior Advisor for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the 
State Department, a North Korea Working Group, was established 
under the Office of the Deputy Secretary, Richard Armitage.  This in 
turn led to the creation of the Illicit Activities Initiative (IAI), an inter-
agency group co-chaired by Asher.61 The IAI was, according to Asher, 
‘to counter North Korean illicit activities’ and was not a substitute for 
diplomacy but a complement.  In reality, IAI has been anything but 
complementary and the clash between the two has been bewildering 
and is far from being resolved.  Amongst other things IAI ‘developed a 
range of sophisticated policy options and plans, including the careful 
use of the USA Patriot Act and other tools to cut off North Korea’s 
access to its network of illicit banking partners around the world’.62  
 
In his evidence to a Congressional committee in April 2006, Asher left 
no doubt as to the resources deployed or his confidence in the outcome: 
 
… the IAI spawned multiple large-scale US international criminal 
investigations. These involved the US Secret Service, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, DEA, ICE, and ATF and many foreign 
partners. The results of these investigations for the most part have 
yet to see the light of day but I am confident that when they 
emerge, the allegations of state-led North Korean criminal 
activity will be more than fully born out.63 
 
The action against the BDA formally commenced on 15 September 
2005 when the US Treasury designated the bank as a ‘primary money 
laundering concern’ under Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act.  This 
curious section allows Treasury to impose restrictions on foreign banks 
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or countries without producing evidence, and so far none has been 
produced. 64  By imposing US law on foreign entities it embodies a 
claim to extraterritoriality which has significant implications, and 
memories, for the Chinese, in particular, but also aroused concern 
elsewhere, including the European Banking Federation.65  The timing 
was seen by many as a deliberate attempt to scuttle the Six-Party Talks 
and, intentionally or not, it kept the Joint Statement of that month 
suspended until the real reopening of the talks in February 2007.66 
 
The Treasury’s press statement at the time of the designation makes 
interesting reading because it mixes the indisputably legitimate with 
allegations of illegality in the same charge sheet. 67  The BDA has 
provided financial services to DPRK companies for over 20 years and 
handles the bulk of the DPRK’s precious metal sales we are told, as if 
there were something wrong with that.  Interestingly, a recent 
American report has suggested that it was precisely these quite 
legitimate sales of gold that the Treasury was trying to disrupt with its 
accusations of illicit activity.68 The description of the supposed illicit 
activity is again a strange melange of the legitimate and illegitimate, 
and is strangely unspecific:  
 
Banco Delta Asia's special relationship with the DPRK has 
specifically facilitated the criminal activities of North Korean 
government agencies and front companies. For example, sources 
show that senior officials in Banco Delta Asia are working with 
DPRK officials to accept large deposits of cash, including 
counterfeit U.S. currency, and agreeing to place that currency 
into circulation.69   
 
For a bank to accept large deposits of cash seems hardly exceptional, 
especially in Asia, but what the Treasury means, though does not say, is 
that it thinks this cash is coming from illicit activities, such as drugs 
and counterfeit cigarettes and is being laundered. Elsewhere, Daniel 
Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and 
Financial Crimes and Adam J. Szubin, Director of the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, in testifying before a Congressional committee in April 
2007 talked of ‘hundreds of millions of dollars’.70 
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The designation of the bank as a ‘primary money laundering concern’ 
caused a run and the Macanese authorities were forced to step in and 
take over the bank, freezing  US$25 million in DPRK-related accounts.  
The authorities commissioned an audit of the bank by the giant US 
accounting firm Ernst & Young, which, in reporting its findings on 16 
December 2005, concluded that ‘the bank did not introduce counterfeit 
U.S. currency notes into circulation over the relevant period’.71  There 
were US reports in March 2007 that the audit had cleared the BDA.72  
The Ernst & Young report was not made public until 16 April 2007 
when it was released to the American media chain McClatchy 
Newspapers which had produced by far the best coverage on the 
story.73 Despite continued Treasury claims, it appears that there was not 
much that was illicit to show: 
 
The Treasury said front companies for North Korea were 
suspected of laundering "hundreds of millions of dollars in cash" 
through the bank, the proceeds of illicit trade in counterfeit U.S. 
currency, smuggled cigarettes and narcotics.  
But the audit found no evidence that this was true.74  
 
The BDA action not merely froze the DPRK accounts but had a knock-
on effect, which delighted Treasury, causing banks to dissociate 
themselves not merely from the BDA but from any contact with the 
DPRK for fear of running foul of Section 311. In consequence, the 
DPRK boycotted the Six-Party Talks and said it would not return until 
financial sanctions were lifted. 
 
For a variety of reasons, including the faltering wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the mid-term elections, which led to the departure of 
Rumsfeld and Bolton, and the North Korea nuclear test, Washington 
appeared to backtrack in late 2006.  Victor Cha, a Korean-American 
academic who was at the time Asia specialist at the White House's 
National Security Council, ‘drafted the crucial memo that helped 
persuade President Bush earlier this year to allow U.S. negotiators to 
meet for bilateral talks with their North Korean counterparts in 
Berlin.’75 
 
In the course of essentially bilateral negotiations between Christopher 
Hill and Kim Kye-gwan it was agreed that the BDA issue would be 
 25 
‘resolved’. Exactly what was agreed has not been made public; 
according to the US press it was the subject of a ‘side agreement’ that 
stipulated that the matter would be settled within 30 days of the Initial 
Actions Agreement of 13 February.76   The main provisions of that 
agreement, mainly the shutting down of the Yongbyon reactor in 
exchange for initial supplies of oil, were to come into effect ‘in 
parallel’ within 60 days. It is clear that for Pyongyang resolution meant 
not just getting its money returned, but the restoration of its linkage 
with the international banking system. There seems little reason to 
suppose that Hill was not made quite aware of that.  
 
Following the February agreement there was a curiously semi-public 
battle between State and Treasury over the frozen accounts.  Although 
Secretary Condoleezza Rice said that she was working amicably with 
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, there were reports that State 
officials were complaining that Treasury was sabotaging the Initial 
Actions Agreement by refusing to unfreeze all the funds.77 Apparently 
Treasury was defeated on this, and was compelled to release all the 
funds but, in a Parthian shot, blocked the BDA from the US banking 
system ensuring that, in effect, the sanctions were not lifted. 78  The 
Chinese government expressed ‘deep regret’ – quite a strong term in 
current diplomatic usage concerning the United States.79 
 
At the time of writing the BDA issue is far from resolved.80  The North 
Koreans are testing whether the financial sanctions have been lifted, 
and will probably find out that they have not been.81  What will happen 
then, or perhaps not happen, is uncertain. 
 
However, there are two aspects of this strange business that concern us 
here. Firstly, what we have is an action by a US government agency 
(Treasury), under US law (USA Patriot Act) against a Chinese bank in 
Chinese territory.  DPRK companies, and financial institutions such as 
the (British) joint venture Daedong Credit Bank, were merely 
customers. 82   In fact, at times is was claimed that the DPRK was 
peripheral and that the real concern was the BDA.83 
 
Secondly, it turns out that the BDA was not the main target at all.  
David Asher, who has left State Department and is now at the Heritage 
Foundation, is less circumscribed by government position than before. 
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On 14 September 2006, Asher gave a lecture entitled ‘How to 
Approach the China–North Korea Relationship’. 84  His lecture was 
fairly standard fare on how the US should utilise China to curb the 
DPRK’s ‘weapons proliferation’ and spread capitalism to North Korea.  
There may be some slight conceptual confusion here given that the 
major capitalist countries, China (by Asher’s definition), Russia, France, 
Germany, United Kingdom and especially the United States, dominate 
the world’s trade in arms, with the DPRK very much a bit player.85  
 
However, that lecture was given before the US decision to backtrack on 
IAI and reengage in the Six-Party Talks. In April 2007 Asher was 
quoted by the New York Times as saying something rather more 
interesting:  
 
Yet Banco Delta Asia had never been the main offender in Macao. 
“The fact is that Banco Delta was an easy target in the sense that 
it was not so large that its failure would bring down the financial 
system,” said Mr. Asher, who is now a senior associate fellow 
with the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation. 
 
“Banco Delta may be a sacrificial lamb in some people’s minds, 
but it is not about Banco Delta,” he said. “It’s about Macao, 
Macao’s government, China, the Chinese government and their 
complicity and their accommodative behavior toward North 
Korea’s illegal activities, proliferation activities and leadership 
financial activities.”86 
 
But is it really about ‘China’s complicity with North Korean illegal 
activities’ or really about China itself?87 Is North Korea being used as a 
proxy in this business, much as the Japanese use the ‘North Korea 
threat’ to justify remilitarisation when they have China in mind?88  One 
of the big battles between the United States and China today is in the 
field of ‘intellectual property rights’, which covers a wide gamut of 
things from the unduly close emulation of American products to 
outright counterfeiting and industrial espionage.  Twenty years ago the 
concern was Japan, now it is China.  There is also the associated issue 
of narcotics. In the background there is the faltering economic 
hegemony as China challenges the United States across the spectrum 
from trade, foreign reserves, to research and development in space, and 
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in commerce, extending even into packaging for cosmetics.89 Again, 
this has echoes of fears of Japan twenty years ago becoming ‘number 
one’. 90  This, combined with a tradition of anti-Communism, has 
produced a fear of foreign challenge that is probably unmatched in 
American history.  Yellow peril and red peril are morphed into one.  
 
Max Boot, the well-known American writer who is also Senior Fellow 
for National Security Studies  at the Council for Foreign Relations, put 
the fear rather splendidly in an article in the Los Angeles Times entitled 
‘China's Stealth War on the U.S” 
 
Their different approaches include financial warfare (subverting 
banking systems and stock markets), drug warfare (attacking the 
fabric of society by flooding it with illicit drugs), psychological 
and media warfare (manipulating perceptions to break down 
enemy will), international law warfare (blocking enemy actions 
using multinational organizations), resource warfare (seizing 
control of vital natural resources), even ecological warfare 
(creating man-made earthquakes or other natural disasters). 91  
 
In an atmosphere like this it is not too fanciful to see the BDA affair, 
and the Illicit Activates Initiative as being part of a deeper and wider 
fear, perhaps paranoia, about China.  In which case, as with Japan, 
China cannot just apply pressure on North Korea to accede to American 
demands, because the ultimate target is China itself. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has raised more questions on the issue of China-North 
Korea relations than it has provided answers, but it has attempted to 
tease out some of the complexities and uncertainties involved. A 
Chinese and/or Korea research collaborator, and access to information 
not easily or publicly accessible would be valuable in facilitating a 
deeper analysis. However, it is unlikely that the fundamental argument 
of this paper will be unchanged. The bilateral China-North Korea 
relations cannot be examined in isolation but only within the broader 
geopolitical context, and the Six-Party framework provides a good 
focus for that. The issue is current, ongoing and dynamic, so any 
interpretation can only be tentative.   
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Appendices 
 
Table A1: North Korea’s trade with world and with China, 1997-2005 
Year World China 
  total share Imports Exports 
 $m $m % $m $m 
1997 2,170 650 30.0 530 120 
1998 1,440 410 28.5 350 60 
1999 1,480 370 25.0 320 50 
2000 1,970 480 24.4 450 30 
2001 2,270 737 32.5 570 160 
2002 2,260 733 32.4 460 270 
2003 2,900 1,023 35.3 630 390 
2004 3,100 1,385 44.7 na na  
2005 4,050 1,580 39.0 1,080 500 
Source: Li, Dunqiu "DPRK's Reform and Sino-DPRK Economic Cooperation " In 
Nautilus Policy Forum Online, 2006. 
Note: the calculation for share is mine.  Li’s original figures are in $100 million, and I 
have changed to $m to make comparison with other tables easier.  Li uses the phrases 
‘China’s export’ and ‘China’s import’, reflecting the Chinese source, and I have changed 
this around to (NK) imports and exports to make it consistent with usage elsewhere in 
this paper.  This is rather inexact.  Country A’s reported exports to country B always 
differs from Country B’s reported imports from A.  However, since all the data here is 
from partners anyway, the change in terminology seems acceptable. 
 
Table A2: North Korea’s major trading partners, 1989-2006 
$m 
A: Exports 
 World China Japan S. Korea Russia 
1989 1,704 167 268 19 887 
1994 1,039 181 328 176 44 
1996 1,201 69 291 182 347 
1998 965 51 219 92 8 
1999 892 42 203 122 7 
2000 995 37 257 152 8 
2001 1,047 167 226 176 15 
2002 1,274 271 234 272 10 
2003 1,066 396 173 289 3 
2004 na 582 164 258 na 
2005 na 499 132 340 na 
2006* na 199 na 199 na 
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B: Imports 
 World China Japan S. Korea Russia 
1989 2,905 399 216 0.1 1,486 
1994 1,286 467 171 18 70 
1996 2,055 497 226 70 525 
1998 1,300 357 175 130 56 
1999 1,436 329 148 212 48 
2000 2,047 451 207 273 36 
2001 3,272 571 1,065 227 56 
2002 2,436 467 133 370 47 
2003 2,049 628 91 435 112 
2004 na 795 89 439 na 
2005 na 1,081 63 715 na 
2006* na 580 na 359 na 
 
C: Total of exports and imports 
 World China Japan S. Korea Russia 
1989 4,609 565 483 19 2,373 
1994 2,325 648 499 194 114 
1996 3,256 566 517 252 872 
1998 2,265 408 394 222 64 
1999 2,328 371 351 334 55 
2000 3,042 488 464 425 44 
2001 4,319 738 1,291 403 71 
2002 3,710 738 367 642 57 
2003 3,115 1,024 264 724 115 
2004 na 1,377 253 697 Na 
2005 na 1,580 195 1,056 Na 
2006* na 779 na 558 Na 
*first half 
 
Sources 
1989, South Korea: Inter-Korea trade 1989-2001: Intra-Korea Trade Trend KOTRA, [cited 
19 May 2003]. Available from http://crm.kotra.or.kr/main/info/nk/eng/sntrade/yearly.php3.  
1989, World: Hwang, Eui-Gak. The Korean economies: a comparison of North and South. 
Oxford and New York: Clarendon, 1993. 
1989, Russia (Soviet Union): Park, Phillip H. ‘Self-reliance or self-destruction? Success 
and failure of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's development strategy of 
self-reliant 'juche'. Edited by Edward Beauchamp. New York and London: 
Routledge, 2002. 
1989, China, Japan: Koo, Bon-hak. Political Economy of Self-reliance: Juche and 
Economic Development in North Korea, 1961-1990. Seoul: Research Center for 
Peace and Unification of Korea, 1992. 
1994-2002: Nanto, Dick K., and Emma  Chanlett-Avery. The North Korean Economy: 
Background and Policy Analysis. Washington: Congressional Research Service 
report for Congress RL32493, 2005. 
World, 2003: "Statistics on North Korea in General (As of 2004) " ROK Ministry of 
Unification, 14 February 2006. 
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China, Japan, 2003-05: "North Korea’s Trade with China and Japan over the Past Five 
years " ROK Ministry of Unification, 6 February 2006. 
South Korea 2003-05: "Inter-Korean Trade Volume from 2000 to 2005 " ROK Ministry 
of Unification, 23 January 2006. 
China, South Korea, first half 2006: "North Korea-China Trade Trends in the First Half 
of 2006." ROK Ministry of Unification. 
 
 
Table A3: Japan's trade with the Koreas and China, 1988-2006 
Billions of yen and percentage 
 World ROK DPRK China 
 Export Import Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
Years Yen b Yen b Yen b Yen b Yen b Yen b Yen b % of total Yen b % of total  
1988 33,939 24,006 1,978 1,515 31 42 1,214 3.6 1,264 5.3 
1989 37,823 28,979 2,281 1,788 27 41 1,165 3.1 1,534 5.3 
1990 41,457 33,855 2,518 1,690 25 43 884 2.1 1,730 5.1 
1991 42,360 31,900 2,704 1,663 30 38 1,157 2.7 1,914 6.0 
1992 43,012 29,527 2,253 1,466 28 33 1,510 3.5 2,145 7.3 
1993 40,202 26,826 2,124 1,297 24 28 1,911 4.8 2,278 8.5 
1994 40,498 28,104 2,489 1,380 17 33 1,914 4.7 2,811 10.0 
1995 41,531 31,549 2,928 1,622 24 32 2,062 5.0 3,381 10.7 
1996 44,731 37,993 3,192 1,735 25 32 2,382 5.3 4,400 11.6 
1997 50,938 40,956 3,153 1,763 22 37 2,631 5.2 5,062 12.4 
1998 50,645 36,654 2,005 1,577 23 29 2,621 5.2 4,844 13.2 
1999 47,548 35,268 2,606 1,824 17 23 2,657 5.6 4,875 13.8 
2000 51,654 40,938 3,309 2,205 22 28 3,274 6.3 5,941 14.5 
2001 48,979 42,416 3,072 2,088 130 27 3,764 7.7 7,027 16.6 
2002 52,109 42,228 3,572 1,937 17 29 4,980 9.6 7,728 18.3 
2003 54,548 44,362 4,022 2,071 11 20 6,635 12.2 8,731 19.7 
2004 61,170 49,217 4,785 2,383 10 18 7,994 13.1 10,199 20.7 
2005 65,657 56,949 5,146 2,695 7 15 8,837 13.5 11,975 21.0 
2006 75,246 67,344 5,849 3,178 5 9 10,794 14.3 13,784 20.5 
Source: Trade Statistics of Japan Ministry of Finance, 2007 [cited 30 April 2007]. Available from 
http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/index_e.htm. 
¥112 bn of Japanese exports to DPRK in 2001 are due to a large consignment of rice aid. (see text 
and accompanying endnote)  
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Table A4: DPRK and ROK in China's foreign trade, 1950-2005 
 Total DPRK ROK 
 Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports 
 $m  $m % $m % $m % $m % 
1950 550.0 580.0 3.8 0.7 2.8 0.5     
1951 760.0 1,200.0 17.2 2.3 0.9 0.1     
1952 820.0 1,120.0 21.4 2.6 2.0 0.2     
1953 1,020.0 1,350.0 45.1 4.4 1.3 0.1     
1954 1,150.0 1,290.0 79.7 6.9 2.6 0.2     
1955 1,410.0 1,730.0 72.6 5.1 3.5 0.2     
1956 1,650.0 1,560.0 61.8 3.7 6.7 0.4     
1957 1,600.0 1,510.0 36.5 2.3 19.5 1.3     
1958 1,980.0 1,890.0 47.7 2.4 42.8 2.3     
1959 2,260.0 2,120.0 70.9 3.1 45.0 2.1     
1960 1,860.0 1,950.0 67.4 3.6 53.0 2.7     
1961 1,490.0 1,450.0 63.8 4.3 53.1 3.7     
1962 1,490.0 1,170.0 80.4 5.4 54.1 4.6     
1963 1,650.0 1,270.0 87.1 5.3 64.3 5.1     
1964 1,920.0 1,550.0 90.3 4.7 65.0 4.2     
1965 2,230.0 2,020.0 97.0 4.4 83.3 4.1     
1966 2,370.0 2,250.0 114.8 4.8 88.5 3.9     
1967 2,140.0 2,020.0 93.6 4.4 83.0 4.1     
1968 2,100.0 1,950.0 67.2 3.2 45.9 2.4     
1969 2,200.0 1,830.0 47.2 2.1 44.9 2.5     
1970 2,260.0 2,330.0 60.9 2.7 54.2 2.3     
1971 2,640.0 2,210.0 94.3 3.6 72.4 3.3     
1972 3,440.0 2,860.0 164.4 4.8 118.6 4.1     
1973 5,820.0 5,160.0 217.6 3.7 118.4 2.3     
1974 6,950.0 7,620.0 243.3 3.5 146.3 1.9     
1975 7,260.0 7,490.0 284.1 3.9 197.8 2.6     
1976 6,860.0 6,580.0 250.0 3.6 145.0 2.2     
1977 7,590.0 7,210.0 227.2 3.0 147.2 2.0     
1978 9,750.0 10,890.0 230.7 2.4 223.6 2.1     
1979 13,660.0 15,670.0 317.0 2.3 330.2 2.1     
1980 18,270.0 19,550.0 374.2 2.0 303.3 1.6     
           
1986 27,014.3 33,083.0 217.1 0.8 273.6 0.8     
1987 34,710.5 33,398.9 260.1 0.7 273.2 0.8     
           
1988 40,639.5 39,849.8 244.3 0.6 232.4 0.6     
           
1990 62,091.4 53,345.1 358.2 0.6 124.6 0.2 1,259.5 2.0 684.0 1.3 
1991 71,842.5 63,790.6 524.8 0.7 85.7 0.1 2,178.7 3.0 1,066.2 1.7 
           
2003 438,227.8 412,759.8 627.7 0.1 395.3 0.1 20,094.8 4.6 43,128.1 10.4 
2004 593,325.6 561,228.7 799.5 0.1 585.7 0.1 27,811.6 4.7 62,234.1 11.1 
2005 761,953.4 659,952.8 1,081.1 0.1 499.1 0.1 35,107.8 4.6 76,820.4 11.6 
Sources 
1950-80:  Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing: State Statistical Bureau of People's Republic of 
China, 1981. 
1986-7:  Zhongguo dui wai jing ji mao yi nian jian (China foreign economic and trade 
yearbook). Beijing: Zhongguo zhanwang chubanshe 1988. 
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1988:   Almanac of China's foreign economic relations and trade. Hong Kong: China 
Resources Advertising Co Ltd, 1989. 
1990-1:  China's customs statistics yearbook. Hong Kong: Economic Information & Agency, 
1991. 
2003-4:  Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005. 
2005:  Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006. 
Note:  Holding of Chinese statistics are currently very sparse in New Zealand.  The data prior 
to 2003 is from personal copies of yearbooks. Data since then is on from the web.  
 No entry is given for ROK prior to 1990  
 
 
 
Table A5: China's economic cooperation with DPRK, ROK, 2004-05 
Turnover in $m 
 Total DPRK ROK 
 
 2004 
Total 21,369.0 39.4 380.4 
Contracted projects 17,468.3 34.9 104.8 
Labour cooperation 3,753.3 4.4 275.6 
Design consultation 147.4 0.2 0.0 
 
 2005 
Total 26,776.1 31.6 526.0 
Contracted projects 21,763.2 26.3 212.2 
Labour cooperation 4,785.6 5.1 313.8 
Design consultation 227.2 0.1 0.0 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006, Table 18.23. 
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Table A6 China’s overseas investment, 2004-05, major destinations  
  Net Overseas 
Direct 
Investment in 
2004 
Net Overseas 
Direct 
Investment in 
2005 
Accumulated Net 
Overseas Direct 
Investment at the End of 
2005 
Total  5,498 12,261 57,206 
     
$m 2,628 3,420 36,507 Hong Kong 
% 47.8 27.9 63.8 
     
$m 1,286 5,163 8,936 Cayman Islands 
% 23.4 42.1 15.6 
     
$m 386 1,226 1,984 Virgin Is. (E) 
% 7.0 10.0 3.5 
     
$m 40 589 882 Republic of Korea 
% 0.7 4.8 1.5 
     
$m 120 232 823 United States 
% 2.2 1.9 1.4 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006 Table 18.20 . 
Note: DPRK is not mentioned 
 
Table A7: Foreign investment in China by selected countries, 2004-05 
  2004 2005 
 Country 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
Foreign 
other 
investment 
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
Foreign 
other 
investment 
Total 
investment 
rank Total 60,630.0 3,443.0 60,324.6 3,480.4 63,805.0 
1 Hong Kong, China 18,998.3 1,806.7 17,948.8 1,849.2 19,798.0 
2 Virgin Islands 6,730.3 103.1 9,021.7 115.1 9,136.8 
3 Japan 5,451.6 67.5 6,529.8 116.6 6,646.4 
4 Republic of Korea 6,247.9 5.4 5,168.3 16.2 5,184.5 
5 United States 3,941.0 3.3 3,061.2 13.2 3,074.4 
6 Taiwan, China 3,117.5 340.6 2,151.7 404.6 2,556.3 
7 Singapore 2,008.1 1.8 2,204.3 5.5 2,209.8 
8 Cayman Islands 2,042.6 0.0 1,947.5 0.0 1,947.5 
9 Germany 1,058.5 0.0 1,530.0 7.2 1,537.3 
10 Samoan 1,128.9 0.0 1,351.9 0.0 1,351.9 
97 Korea DPR 2.7 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 
98 Viet Nam 1.1 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2006, Table 18.16. 
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